Ciphertext policy attribute based encryption is an encryption technique where the data is encrypted according to an access policy over attributes. Users who have a secret key associated with a set of attributes which satisfy the access policy can decrypt the encrypted data. However, one of the drawbacks of the CP-ABE is that it does not support updating access control policies without decrypting the encrypted data.We present a new variant of the CP-ABE scheme called ciphertext policy attribute based proxy re-encryption (CP-ABPRE). The proposed scheme allows to update the access control policy of the encrypted data without decrypting the ciphertext. The scheme uses a semitrusted entity called proxy to re-encrypt the encrypted data according to a new access control policy such that only users who satisfy the new policy can decrypt the data. The construction of our scheme is based on prime order bilinear groups. We give a formal definition for semantic security and provide a security proof in the generic group model.
INTRODUCTION
Recent studies explore the use of cryptographic techniques to enforce access control policies. Ciphertext policy attribute based encryption (CP-ABE) schemes allow the data to be encrypted according to an access control policy over a set of descriptive attributes (e.g. doctor and nurse). Once the data is encrypted, it can be safely stored in an un-trusted server such that everyone can download the encrypted data (even a malicious user), but only users who have the right secret key associated with a set of attributes which satisfy the access policy can decrypt. Therefore, when the data is encrypted using a CP-ABE, access policy moves with the data and there is no need for the use of other entities, such as access-control managers, to enforce access control policy. For instance, Bob can encrypt his health data according to the access policy p 1 = [Bob OR (GP AND Hospital 1)], and upload encrypted data to an un-trusted Personal Health Record (PHR) server. Only users who have attributes Bob or GP and Hospital 1 can decrypt the ciphertext, so neither the server itself nor an unauthorized person can decrypt the ciphertext.
Despite numerous advantageous features of the CP-ABE schemes compared to the traditional access control technologies, CP-ABE schemes does not support updating access control policies. The only way is to decrypt the data and then reencrypt it according to a new access control policy. Following the above example, if Bob wants to change the access control policy from p 1 to p 2 = [Bob OR (GP AND (Hospital 1 OR Hospital 2))] (in order to hear a second opinion from a GP from Hospital 2), Bob has to re-encrypt his data according to p 2 . A naive solution for Bob to re-encrypt his data would be to send to the PHR server his secret key. Once the PHR server receives the secret key, it decrypts the data and then use the CP-ABE scheme to re-encrypt the data according to the new policy p 2 . However , the drawback of this approach is that the server accesses sensitive plain data. To avoid this drawback Bob might perform by himself the reencryption process. Therefore, Bob has to download the encrypted data from the PHR server, decrypt the data locally using his secret key, and then re-encrypt the data using the CP-ABE scheme. The drawback of this approach is that Bob has to be online during each re-encryption process which is not very efficient both from the communication and processing point of view.
Our Contribution. To overcome the aforementioned drawbacks of the CP-ABE schemes, we propose a ciphertext policy attribute based proxy re-encryption (CP-ABPRE) scheme. In the proposed scheme Bob has to compute only once the re-encryption key rk p 1 →p 2 which is used by a semitrusted entity called proxy (i.e. PHR server) to update all ciphertexts encrypted according to policy p 1 into ciphertexts encrypted according to policy p 2 . The proxy is a semitrusted entity in the sense that it does not have access to the plain data. However it needs to perform re-encryption computations, and also has to stop performing these computations when Bob (the delegator) who generated the re-encryption key rk p 1 →p 2 does not want to re-encrypt future ciphertexts associated with the access policy p 1 . One of the distinctive features of the proposed scheme is that it is collision resistance, the feature which is lacking in almost all the proxy re-encryption schemes in the conventional public key cryptography. The collision resistance feature implies that even if the proxy and delegate collude they cannot generate a new secret key. In general, the scheme is useful for dynamic environments where the access policy which controls access to the data changes frequently (e.g. personal health record systems).
The construction of our scheme is based on prime order bilinear groups. The size of the ciphertext depends on the size of the access policy and the size of the user secret key depends on the number of attributes that the user possesses. We give a formal definition for semantic security and provide a security proof in the generic group model.
Related Work
Proxy Re-encryption. In a proxy re-encryption scheme, introduced by Mambo and Okamoto (?), a proxy is a semitrusted entity which can transform an encryption computed under Bobs' (delegator) public key to an encryption computed under Alices'(delegatee) public key. The proxy is a semitrusted entity i.e. it is trusted to perform only the ciphertext re-encryption, without knowing the secret keys of Bob and Alice, and without having access to the plain data. Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss (?) introduced the notion of "atomic proxy functions" -functions that transform ciphertext corresponding to one key into ciphertext corresponding to another key without revealing any information about the secret decryption keys or plain data. However the scheme presented in (?) is bidirectional where one re-encryption key can be used to transform ciphertext from the delegator to the delegatee and vice versa, and is useful only for the scenarios where the trust relationship between involved parties is mutual. To overcome this situation Jakobsson (?) and Zhou et al. (?) proposed a quorum-controlled protocol where a proxy is divided into many components. Dodis and Ivan (?) propose a number of unidirectional proxy re-encryption for El-Gamal, RSA and IBE scheme, where the delegator's secret key is divided into two shares: one share for the proxy and one share for the delegatee. The drawback of the proposed schemes is that they are collusion-unsafe, i.e. if the proxy and the delegatee collude then they can recover the delegator's secret key. Matsuo (?) and Green and Atteniese (?) propose identity-based proxy re-encryption scheme, where the encrypted data under the public key generated by delegators' identity is re-encrypted to an encrypted data under the public key generated by delegatees' identity.
Attribute-based Encryption. Sahai and Waters (?) introduce the concept of Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) where a ciphertext and user secret key are associated with a set of attributes. ABE relies on the presence of a trusted authority (TA) who is in possession of a master key which is used to generate secret keys of users. A user can decrypt the ciphertext if the user secret key has the list of attributes specified in the ciphertext. In CP-ABE (?; ?; ?) the user secret key is associated with a set of attributes and a ciphertext is associated with an access control policy over a list of attributes. The decryptor can decrypt the ciphertext if the list of attributes associated with the secret key satisfies the access policy. In Key-Policy AttributeBased Encryption (KP-ABE) (?) the idea is reversed and the secret key is associated with an access control policy over a list of attributes and the ciphertext is associated with a list of attributes. The decryptor can decrypt the ciphertext if the list of attributes associated with the ciphertext satisfy the access policy associated with the secret key.
Attribute-based Encryption and Proxy Reencryption. Guo et al. (?) propose a proxy re-encryption scheme based on the Goyal et al.
(?) KP-ABE scheme. The proposed scheme can transform a ciphertext associated with a set of attributes into a new ciphertext associated with another set of attributes. Generally, adapting CP-ABE to proxy re-encryption is more suitable than adapting KP-ABE to proxy re-encryption since CP-ABE allows the encryptor to express her policies in the encryption phase, while in KP-ABE the access policy is associated with the secret key and is defined in the key generation phase.
Lliang et al. (?) proposed an attribute-based proxy re-encryption scheme. The Lliang et al. scheme is based on the Cheung and Newport CP-ABE scheme (?) and it inherits the same limitations that (?) has: it supports only access policies with AND boolean operator, and the size of the ciphertext increases linearly with the number of attributes in the system.
Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section ?? provides background information. In Section ?? we give a formal definition of the CiphertextPolicy Attribute-Based Proxy Re-Encryption scheme (CP-ABPRE) and its security model. Section ?? describes the construction of the CP-ABPRE scheme. The last section concludes the paper.
BACKGROUND -BILINEAR GROUPS
The scheme presented in section ?? is based on pairings over groups of prime order. Let 0 and T be two multiplicative groups of prime order p, and let g be a generator of 0 . A pairing (or bilinear map) e : 0 × 0 → T satisfies the following properties (?):
0 is said to be a bilinear group if the group operation in 0 and the bilinear mapê : 0 × 0 → T can be computed efficiently. Note that the map is symmetric
CIPHERTEXT-POLICY ATTRIBUTE-BASED PROXY RE-ENCRYPTION (CP-ABPRE)
A CP-ABPRE scheme extends CP-ABE scheme by adding a proxy component to the existing components: the trusted authority (TA) and users. Another extension has been made to the number of algorithms. CP-ABPRE uses the RKGen algorithm to generate a re-encryption key and Re − Encrypt algorithm to reencrypt the ciphertext, in addition to the four algorithms of CP-ABE scheme: Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt.
Definition 1. A CP-ABPRE scheme is a tuple of six algorithms
• Setup(λ) run by the trusted authority (TA), the algorithm on input of the security parameter λ outputs the master secret key MK which is kept private, and the master public key PK which is distributed to users.
• KeyGen(MK, ω) run by the trusted authority (TA), the algorithm takes as input a set of attributes ω identifying the user, and the master secret key MK, and it outputs a user secret key SK ω associated with the set of attributes ω.
• Encrypt(m, p 1 , PK) run by the encryptor, the algorithm takes as input a message to be encrypted m, an access policy p 1 over a list of attribute which specifies which combination of attribute the decryptor needs to posses in order to obtain m, and the master public key PK. The algorithm outputs the ciphertext CT p 1 associated with the access policy p 1 .
• RKGen(SK ω , p 1 , p 2 , PK) run by the delegator, this algorithm takes as input the secret key SK ω , the access policies p 1 and p 2 , and the master public key PK. The algorithm outputs a unidirectional re-encryption key rk p 1 →p 2 if SK ω satisfies p 1 , or an error symbol ⊥ if ω does not satisfy p 1 .
• Re − Encrypt(CT p 1 , rk p 1 →p 2 ) run by the proxy, this algorithm takes as input the ciphertext CT p 1 and the re-encryption key rk p 1 →p 2 , and outputs the ciphertext CT p 2 associated with the access policy p 2 .
• Decrypt(CT p i , SK ω ) run by the decryptor, the algorithm takes as input the ciphertext C p i and the secret key SK ω , and output a message m if ω satisfies p i , or an error symbol ⊥ if ω does not satisfy p i . Security Model. In the following we present the game-based security definition (security model) of the CP-ABPRE scheme. Informally, the security model guarantees that: a) an user (adversary) who does not have enough attributes to satisfy the access policy p * of the ciphertext cannot learn any information about the plaintext being encrypted, b) two users cannot combine their attributes to extend their decryption power, for instance two users cannot combine their secret keys and decrypt a ciphertext associated with p * if none of users secret keys satisfy p * , and c) the proxy and an user cannot combine the re-encryption key and the secret key in order to compute a new secret key. Therefore in the security game, played between the adversary A and the challenger (the challenger simulates the game and answers A's queries) we allow A to compromise users secret key except the secret keys which satisfy the challenge access policy p * . In addition, A is allowed also to compromise proxy keys or re-encryption keys with the following restriction:
• A is not allowed to ask secret key queries for the attribute set ω which satisfies p 2 if A has a reencryption key rk p * →p 2 . The reason for this restriction is that A can use the re-encryption key to re-encrypt the challenge ciphertext associated with p * to a ciphertext associated with p 2 and decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext using his secret key which satisfies p 2 . In the sequel we will refer to p 2 as a challenge derivative access policy if A has the re-encryption key rk p * →p 2 .
At one point of the security game A gives to the challenger two messages and the challenge access policy • Keygen(ω j ) queries such that SK ω j satisfies a challenge access structure p * .
• Keygen(ω j ) queries such that SK ω j satisfies any challenge derivative access policies.
• RKGen(p 1 , p 2 ) queries if A previously has issued Keygen(ω j ) such that SK ω j satisfies p 2 and p 1 is a challenge derivative access policy.
The challenger selects b ∈ R (0, 1) and returns 
CONSTRUCTION OF CP-ABPRE SCHEME
Before introducing the scheme, we briefly explain the structure of the access policy associated with the ciphertext. In our scheme an access control policy is a monotonic boolean formula of conjunction and disjunctions of attributes. The TA in the Setup phase defines the universe of all attributes Ω. An example of the universe of all attribute can be Ω = {A, B,C, D, F}, and an example of an access policy can be
Assigning Values to Attributes in the Access Policy. To enforce the access policy in such a way that only users who satisfy the access policy can decrypt the ciphertext, in the encryption phase, the encryptor encrypts the data according to the access policy. Therefore, the encryptor in the encryption phase picks a secret value s and shares it according to the access policy under which the data is encrypted. We use Benaloh and Leichter (?) secret sharing scheme to share s. The scheme (?) works as follows:
• Transforms an access policy p 1 into an access tree τ and set the value of the root node of τ to be s. Then, recursively for each non-leaf node do the following:
-If the symbol is ∨, set the values of each child node to be s. -If the symbol is ∧, for each child node, except the last one, assign a random value s i where 1 ≤ s i ≤ p − 1, and to the last child node assigns Policy Evaluation. To decrypt a ciphertext, a user secret key SK ω associated with a set of attributes ω has to satisfy the policy p 1 =(A ∧ B) ∨ (C ∧ D) associated with the ciphertext. In the example, if ω = {A, B} then the policy is satisfied since s = s A + s B . This can be verified by substituting the attributes in ω ∩ p 1 = {A, B} (attributes which appear in ω and p 1 ) by true, and attributes in p 1 ∖ ω = {C, D} (attributes which appear in p 1 but not appear in ω) by false. We say that the user satisfies the policy if p 1 =(true ∧ true) ∨ (false ∧ false) evaluates to true.
The Scheme
In this section we describe the construction of the proposed CP-ABPRE scheme. The scheme consists of the following algorithms:
1. Setup(λ). The setup algorithm selects a bilinear group 0 of prime order p and generator g, and the bilinear mapê : 0 × 0 → T . Next to this, the algorithm generates the list of attributes in the system
The algorithm also defines the function H 1 : T → 0 . The public key is published as:
, H 1 ). The master secret key consists of the following components:
KeyGeneration(MK, ω).
The key generation algorithm takes as input the attribute set ω which characterize the user. For each user the algorithm picks at random r ∈ ℤ * p and computes the secret key SK ω which consists of the following components:
3. Encryption(m, p 1 , PK). To encrypt a message m ∈ T , under the access policy p 1 over the set of attributes from Ω, the encryption algorithm picks at random s ∈ ℤ * p and assigns s i values to attributes in p 1 ( s i values are shares of s and are generated using the Benaloh and Leichter (?) secret sharing scheme). The resulted ciphertext consists of the following components:
The algorithm outputs a re-encryption key which is used by the proxy to update the ciphertext associated with p 1 to a ciphertext associated with p 2 . Let ω ′ ⊆ ω be the smallest set which satisfies the access policy p 1 . The algorithm first parses SK ω as
j } a j ∈ω ), picks at random l, x ′ ∈ ℤ * p , it sets (g f ) x ′ = g x and computes the re-ecnryption key rk p 1 →p 2 which consists of the following components:
Note. Note that the message g x−l encrypted in this phase belongs to the group 0 , while the message m encrypted in the Encryption phase belongs to the group T . The encryption of g x−l is done in the same way as the encryption of m with a small change on the computation of C (2) . The only purpose for this change is to keep g x−l in group 0 . So, in encrypting m in the Encryption phase the C (2) had the form:
s for a random s ∈ ℤ * p . In encrypting g x−l in the RKGen phase the C (2) has the form:
where z is a random element in ℤ * p . All the other components are computed in the same way as in the Encryption phase.
j,i } a j,i ∈p 1 ), and
, and computes the following:
(a) In the first step, for every attribute a j ∈ ω ′ , it computes the following:
In the second step it computes the following:
(c) In the third step it computes the following:
In the fourth step it sets:
The algorithm outputs the re-encrypted ciphertext, which consists of the following components:
The decryption algorithm takes as input the ciphertext C p i and secret key SK ω . It checks if the secret key SK ω related to the attribute set ω satisfies the access policy p i . If not, then it outputs ⊥.
(a) If ω satisfies the access policy p i and C p i is a regular ciphertext, then the decryption algorithm performs the following: i. In the first step, the algorithm chooses the smallest set ω ′ ⊆ ω which satisfies the access policy p i and parses
ii. In the second step, for every attribute a j ∈ ω ′ , it computes
iii. In the third step, it computes
iv. In the final step, the message is obtained by computing
If ω satisfies the access policy p i and C p i is a re-encrypted ciphertext, then the decryption algorithm performs the following: i. In the first step it parses C p i as (Ĉ (1) ,Ĉ (2) ,Ĉ (3) ) ii. In the second step it recovers the message in the following way:
Note. The operation Decrypt(Ĉ (3) , SK ω ) = g x−l (where g x−l is part of the group 0 ) is done in similar way as Decrypt(C p i , SK ω ) = m (where m is part of the group T ) explained under (a). The only change is under (iv) where g x−l is computed as:
while m was computed as:
In the following, we presents the properties of our proposed scheme:
• Uni-directional. The re-encryption key rk p 1 →p 2 only allows the proxy to re-encrypt ciphertexts encrypted under the policy p 1 into ciphertexts encrypted under policy p 2 , and not the other way around. For instance, the re-encryption key rk p 1 →p 2 can be used to re-encrypt ciphertexts associated with a policy p 1 = [Patient AND Bob] into ciphertext associated with a policy p 2 = [General Practitioner (GP)]. The idea is that a GP should access his patients' health data, however individual patients should not be able to access GPs' data since GP possess data from different patients.
• Non-interactive. The re-encryption key rk p 1 →p 2 is computed by the delegator without any interaction with the delegatee, the TA authority or the proxy. To compute rk p 1 →p 2 , the delegator uses his secret key and the master public key. Therefore the delegator remains off-line while computing the re-encryption key and the proxy perform re-encryption process to update ( or re-encrypt) ciphertext without any interaction with the delegator.
• Key Optimal. The delegator and the delegatee don't need to store extra secrets in addition to their original secret keys associated with a set of attributes, regardless of how many delegations he/she gives (or accepts).
• Non-transitivity. The proxy cannot re-delegate the decryption rights. Alternatively it can be said that the proxy cannot combine re-encryption keys to create new delegations. • Multi-user Decryption. In existing proxy reencryption, once the proxy performs the reencryption, the delegator losses the decryption power, thus the delegator cannot use his secret key to decrypt the re-encrypted data. The reason is that the mapping ciphertext-public key is oneto-one, which implies that one ciphertext can be decrypted only by one secret key, thus after the re-encryption is performed only the delegatee has a power to decrypt the ciphertext. One can argue that the proxy can keep a copy of the original ciphertext and enable the delegator to decrypt the original ciphertext. However, this solution requires for the proxy to keep the original ciphertext for each re-encrypted data. CP-ABPRE scheme has a property which allows the delegator to generate a re-encryption key in such a way that that the delegator does not loose his decryption power after the proxy performs the re-encryption, and the re-encrypted ciphertext can be decrypted by many users whose secret key satisfies the access policy. 
Efficiency
The size of the secret key SK ω depends on the number of attributes the user possess and consists of |ω| + 1 group elements in 0 , where |ω| is the cardinality of ω. The size of the ciphertext C p depends on the size of the access policy p 1 and has |p| + 1 group elements in 0 , and 1 group element in T . The size of the reencryption key rk p 1 →p 2 depends on ω ′ which is the smallest set which satisfies p 1 and has |ω ′ | + 1 group elements in 0 .
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work we present a new proxy re-encryption scheme in the CP-ABE setting. The scheme is unidirectional and allows a user (the delegator) to change dynamically the access policy associated with the ciphertext, without necessarily decrypting the ciphertext. To reduce computations performed at the delegators' side and to avoid the need for the delegator to be online all the time, the delegator computes a reencryption key and delegates the power to the proxy to update the access control policy associated with ciphertext. There are two interesting open problems. First, it would be interesting to hide the access control policy from the semi-trusted proxy and from the user who decrypts the data since in our scheme the access policy has to be in clear in order for the user who decrypts the data to apply the right attributes to satisfy the access policy associated with the ciphertext. Second, we leave as an open problem to provide a security proof in the standard model where the problem of breaking the scheme is reduced to a well-studied complexitytheoretic problem.
